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Introduction 
 In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the role of microfinance institutions, 
providing services such as microlending, as a tool for economic development by NGOs and 
international organizations. The increase in publicity microfinance institutions are receiving has 
had dual impacts: first, the successes of microfinance programs have increased the demand for 
microcredit worldwide and second, the prevalence of microcredit programs has highlighted the 
need for diversification of microfinancial services. One such field that has begun to develop as a 
result of this demand for diversified microfinancial services is that of microinsurance. 
 Microinsurance is a tool for increasing economic growth and development by providing 
small scale, low premium insurance policies to members of the poorest strata of society in the 
developing world. (Siegel et al, 2010) In this paper, I will be focusing on the ways in which 
microinsurance programs can be used as a risk management tool for the poor and the 
effectiveness of these programs. In order to provide risk management services, microinsurance 
policies are used to provide farmers and small business owners among these communities with 
the ability to protect their investment in capital (farm equipment, crops, storefront, etc.). The idea 
behind microinsurance programs is that by reducing the amount of money spent on replacing lost 
capital, disposable income can be increased and therefore economic growth and development is 
encouraged amongst the poorest communities in developing nations. Microinsurance can also 
provide these families with much more financial stability, removing the need to constantly 
maintain funds as a “safety net” against potential shocks or losses.(Morduch, 2006) 
 Additionally, a large number of the firms which provide microfinancial and 
microinsurance services come from the non-profit sector. I will explore the relationship between 
non-profit organizations and microinsurance services, looking specifically at why non-profit 
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organizations are providing these services and how their operating methods may differ from for-
profit ventures. I propose that non-profit organizations' focus on providing services and 
correcting market failures rather than on revenue allows them to work in fields in which profit 
margins are perceptibly lower. 
Section I – What is Microinsurance? 
 In order to understand the effectiveness of microinsurance as a risk management tool for 
the poor, we must formulate a clear definition of exactly what microinsurance entails. 
Microinsurance can be described as “The protection of low income people against specific 
threats in exchange for premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and costs of the risks 
involved.” (Cohen and Sebstad, 2005, p.397) The important aspect of this definition is the focus 
microinsurance providers place on “low income people,” which make up the entirety of the 
microinsurance market. As such, microinsurance services need to be marketed to consumers 
differently than normal insurance products and need to be affordable to those living at or beneath 
the poverty line. Indeed, keeping insurance premiums at low enough rates to be affordable as 
well as profitable is one of the main goals as well as challenges faced by providers of 
microinsurance. (Churchill, 2006) This is no small feat, given the drastically different levels of 
income and vulnerability to risk faced by low income families when compared with those 
normally served by the insurance sector. 
 Microinsurance can provide a number of different services within the insurance field and 
the programs offered by microinsurance providers vary depending on local demand and needs. 
The majority of microinsurance services which are available currently are life insurance 
programs, aimed at reducing the economic impact of death on households. The other main types 
of microinsurance services lie in the risk management sector, with policies ranging from housing 
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insurance to insurance on crops and other farming related products. It is this latter section, risk 
management tools, which I will be focusing on in this paper as it has the potential to lift a large 
number around the world out of poverty. 
Section II - Review of the Literature 
 Given that microinsurance is still a developing new field, there was varying quality in 
terms of the articles available, with many of the articles I found relating to microinsurance as a 
mechanism for providing affordable healthcare to the poor. However, it was heartening to find 
that a number of development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Labor 
Organization had done studies of microinsurance as a risk management tool, showing that even 
these large organizations are taking an interest in the potential shown by microinsurance 
programs. (Green and Petal, 2008) 
 To begin with, I found a number of papers that looked at the effects of natural disasters 
and other weather related events on those in the developing world. Many of these papers 
discussed the need for a mechanism by which the poor of these countries could adequately 
protect themselves against these threats. (Halliday, 2006; Smolka, 2006) Halliday discussed the 
impacts of hurricanes and mudslides on the lives of the poor in El Salvador. He describes the 
amount of devastation not only to houses and towns, but also to crops which the people affected 
depended on for survival. He also discusses the delay between the disasters and the arrival of 
international relief efforts. This was helpful in understanding the ways in which members of low 
income communities dealt with severe shocks in the absence of any assistance. The article raises 
the idea that having microinsurance services available in such areas prior to these events could 
help them recover quicker than solely depending on aid. Smolka’s paper focused more on the 
ways in which governments dealt with managing natural disasters, but it did provide insight into 
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this aspect in developing countries. 
 I was also able to find a number of articles describing what microinsurance is and how it 
can be used to help the poor in situations where other methods of support had failed. In 
particular, they discussed the drawbacks to using informal methods of coping over formal ones, 
such as the delayed reaction between shocks and access to funds, drastic reductions in 
consumption as well as increased financial stress during a time of crisis. (Churchill, 2002; 
Churchill, 2006; Cohen et al, 2005) Another related point raised in these articles is the weakness 
of informal and community based coping mechanisms when under the stress of a prolonged 
supply shock, such as a drought.  
There were also a number of articles showing the positive effects of increased insurance 
coverage on the economy as a whole, citing increased life expectancy and disposable income as 
indicators of economic growth. (Arena, 2008; Hussels et al, 2005) From this we can see that 
increased insurance provision has numerous benefits on the recipients as well as the economy, 
strengthening the idea that microinsurance services would have innumerable benefits for the 
communities where it is available. Furthermore, microinsurance plays a role in reducing 
women’s vulnerability in the face of disasters and other adverse events by increasing their ability 
to quickly respond to and cope with these events. (Kar, 2007) Microinsurance can also provide 
an increased level of independence to these women, especially in the event of a spouse’s death. 
 I was able to find a number of articles related to the different ways in which 
microinsurance could be provided to the public. These articles were extremely important in 
showing how non-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) and for-profit insurance providers were 
able to work together to provide services more cheaply and efficiently. (Churchill, 2007; 
Chandhok, 2009) These articles were also essential in understanding exactly how microinsurance 
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services are provided and distributed, especially in rural areas. Also made clear in these articles 
were the numerous challenges faced by microinsurance providers, such as lack of understanding 
of the product, adverse selection and moral hazard. Luckily, these papers also had numerous 
solutions to the problems which were brought up. 
 There were a number of World Bank Reports (Siegel et al, 2001; Skees et al, 2007) 
dealing with actual instances of microinsurance provision in developing countries such as India 
and Uganda, detailing the role of non traditional methods of microinsurance, namely, rainfall 
insurance. (Gine et al, 2010) These policies were described as being more effective due to the 
reduced impact of adverse selection, moral hazard and high transactions costs. The relative 
successes of the rainfall insurance program raise interesting prospects for the future, in that it 
could be possible to easily and accurately insure crops, which had been a very difficult task in 
the past. Morduch (2006) also discusses the many successes of rainfall based microinsurance 
over other forms, but also notes a number of flaws within the system, which will be discussed 
later. 
Section III – Why Provide Microinsurance Services? 
 In looking at the ways in which microinsurance is provided, we must first examine the 
reasons why it should be provided and why these services are being demanded by poor 
communities in developing countries. The focus on microcredit schemes in recent years has been 
a positive step in the fight to provide the poor with financial services, however there are a 
number of social groups without access to these services or who would receive more benefits 
from access to other financial services. Furthermore, the potential market for microinsurance 
services is staggering, with an estimated 3 to 4 billion people living in poverty around the world. 
This is a largely untapped market and if access to microinsurance was made available to them, 
7 
 
the firms providing the services would stand to make a considerable profit. Despite the low level 
of marginal revenue associated with each insurance policy, the total revenue generated by this 
market would prove extremely profitable. (Chandhok, 2009) Providing these services is not only 
a way for insurance firms to make a profit, but would also ensure that gains made via other 
development strategies are not offset by the inability of low income households to respond 
adequately to shocks. 
 To fully explore why microinsurance should be provided, we must first understand the 
concept of household vulnerability and the ways in which microinsurance can serve to reduce 
vulnerability to adverse shocks and losses. Household vulnerability can be described as a 
household's ability to cope with and respond to specific risks, with the ability to respond to risks 
depending on the household's asset base. (Siegel et al, 2010) To help understand the vulnerability 
faced by poor households, we can break down the impacts of adverse shocks into two stages. 
First is the immediate impact of the loss and the need for money to cover the losses faced by the 
household. Second is the longer term impact of reallocating already minimal family assets to 
respond to the reduction in cash flow. Without any method of lessening the impacts of losses, 
they can have long term effects on poor families that may not be resolved by the time another 
loss is experienced. (Cohen and Sebstad, 2005) 
 The main issue that increases the level of vulnerability faced by low income households 
is the fact that many strategies employed by these households are ex post methods of managing 
risk as opposed to ex ante methods. Ex post refers to a method of managing risk after the shock 
or loss has taken place, while ex ante methods of risk management are undertaken before these 
events take place, creating a mechanism for dealing with shocks as soon as they occur. Ex post 
strategies take place after an event has occurred and as such does not provide benefits as quickly 
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as ex ante strategies could. Making microinsurance services accessible to poor communities can 
serve to shift reliance on ex post methods towards reliance on ex ante methods of protection, 
thereby giving these households more robust methods of mitigating the adverse impacts of 
shocks and losses. (Halliday, 2006) By providing families with ex ante methods of risk 
management, they are able to move through the different stages of responding to shocks more 
quickly and thus are able to reduce the financial impacts they would otherwise suffer. 
 I will now provide a brief overview of the informal methods farmers use to support 
themselves during adverse shocks and the potential problems that these methods create. I will 
also look at drawbacks related to microfinance services and the ways in which microcredit 
schemes have failed in situations where microinsurance programs could prove very successful. 
 In developing countries the poor have a number of methods of coping with losses of 
property or adverse shocks, many of them depending on informal family and community based 
relationships rather than established financial organizations and firms. Unfortunately, these 
informal mechanisms of coping are inferior to established financial services and can impose 
greater stress on families both financially and psychologically. (Churchill, 2006) During times of 
crisis, many poor, rural families depend on informal support networks to make it through 
difficult times, utilizing techniques such as borrowing money from members of their 
communities or asking family members to send them remittances. However, these methods of 
coping can often result in unanticipated problems during times of crisis. For example, when 
coping with an event that affects a whole region, such as a drought, community support networks 
often collapse as each member of the community struggles to maintain their own standard of 
living. These informal support networks are, for the most part, examples of ex post coping 
strategies and as such are susceptible to the problems associated with them. Furthermore, rural, 
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low income farmers interviewed by microinsurance facilitators expressed a desire for more 
formal methods of coping, citing that “they find their current options severely constrained.” 
(Cohen et al, 2005) 
 Another method of coping with shocks and losses that is used by low income households 
is by taking out emergency loans, either from financial institutions or from other family 
members. Similar to utilizing informal support networks, taking out emergency loans is an 
example of an ex post coping mechanism and has many of the problems associated with these 
strategies. On top of these, however, is the added strain of having to pay off a loan, usually at a 
high interest rate, while struggling to deal with the losses the household has suffered. 
 In the absence or inaccessibility of these coping mechanisms, many households follow a 
depressingly similar course of action. The most common response to losses by poor households 
is to drastically reduce consumption and stop spending money on “nonessential” items such as 
schooling for children, which could otherwise serve to increase their level of social capital. 
Reducing consumption in order to recoup losses also has the negative effect of reducing standard 
of living as households have a reduced ability to provide basic necessities for themselves, 
increased food insecurity and are less able to cope with further losses.(Morduch, 2006) 
 Given the many problems associated with informal responses to losses, many have 
pointed to the rise in the availability of microcredit programs as a solution for providing risk 
management to the poor. However, there are a number of drawbacks to depending on microcredit 
programs as the solution to the woes of the poor. First is the exclusionary nature of most 
microcredit schemes, as they are directed mainly at the nonagricultural poor, the majority of 
which are business owners. (Churchill, 2002) Although this is a sound business strategy by 
microfinance institutions, it excludes a large amount of the rural population, which makes its 
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effectiveness as a potential risk management tool questionable. Second is the fact that a 
substantial portion of those receiving microcredit loans only use a portion of the loan to invest in 
their businesses, with the rest going towards providing the household with a “safety net” to fall 
back on in the event of a shock or loss. “With many MFIs charging effective interest rates of 40, 
50 percent and higher, this is an expensive safety net.”(Churchill, 2006, p. 382) From this we can 
see that although microcredit schemes can be beneficial to those that have access to them, there 
is a need for a diversification of microfinancial services as microcredit loans are ill suited to the 
task of risk management for the poor. 
Section IV – The Benefits of Microinsurance Over Other Methods of Risk Management 
 Now that I have explored the courses of action available to low income households in the 
absence of access to microinsurance, I will now begin to discuss the opportunities provided to 
poor households when microinsurance services are available to them. There are a number of 
benefits associated with the use of microinsurance schemes, with many of them addressing the 
problems related to informal coping mechanisms. First is the accessible nature of 
microinsurance, which is targeted at those most in need of financial services, namely low 
income, rural poor involved in the agricultural sector. Microinsurance also provides poor 
households with the means to stabilize their income in the face of losses, which serves to 
increase their standard of living. Additionally, the provision of microinsurance services to 
communities who already have access to microcredit programs serves to increase the 
effectiveness of each program respectively. (McKinnon, 2004) 
 As stated above, one of the main advantages of microinsurance over microcredit is that it 
is targeted at the poorest communities in developing nations. As such, it is able to provide 
services to a much larger population than microcredit programs are, which mainly focus on urban 
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and rural business owners. By increasing the potential market that receives these services, the 
number of people benefiting from them will also increase, leading to a larger increase in overall 
social benefit provided. This is an important aspect of microinsurance, especially during periods 
in which there are severe supply shocks. In these situations, “price increases typically harm 
landless laborers and other net consumers.” (Morduch, 2006)The effects of a supply shock on a 
market in which people have access to microinsurance is shown below. 
 Adverse shocks, such as droughts, result in market situations such as the one shown on 
the next page. Supply is greatly reduced from S to S`, resulting in a shift in the equilibrium price 
and quantity from P* to P` and Q* to Q`, respectively. Normally in this situation, low income 
families would have to reduce their consumption as there is no other recourse for them to take 
against significantly higher costs. With access to microinsurance however, these families would 
be able to respond to a supply shock with a much lower decline in their standard of living, as the 
loss in purchasing power that otherwise would have been experienced is negated by the payout 
from the microinsurance provider.  
     
  
 
P’ 
P* 
S 
D 
Q’ Q* 
$ 
Quantity 
S’ 
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Secondly, microinsurance schemes provide families with the means to increase their 
standard of living as they no longer have to devote as large a proportion of their income to 
managing potential risk. By setting aside less money for a “safety net” to fall back on in times of 
crisis, the poor can increase their savings and therefore capital accumulation will become easier. 
(Chandhok, 2009) By freeing up income that was going towards the “safety net,” microinsurance 
recipients will be more able and willing to take part in income generating activities. This shows 
that microinsurance not only provides financial security in the face of shocks and losses but also 
allows the poor to do more with their limited resources. 
 Finally, when low income communities have access to microinsurance services, there is a 
reduction in the demand for emergency loans as there is now a more cost effective method for 
members of the community to manage risk, without having to rely on each other or costly loans. 
By providing microinsurance services in addition to microcredit, low income communities are 
able to choose from a more comprehensive range of financial services. Instead of tailoring a 
microcredit loan to work as both a means of raising capital for a business as well as using it as a 
risk management tool, members of these communities can use both services more effectively and 
would be at a lower risk of defaulting on their loans. In fact, “some MFIs attribute over half of 
their loan losses to the effects of risk events,” (Chruchill, 2006, p. 384) which reinforces the idea 
that delinquency rates for microcredit loans would fall if microinsurance services were also 
provided to these people. These services also provide recipients with a higher level of marginal 
benefits as an increase in income by even a small margin allows for a much greater degree of 
financial freedom. 
Section V – Obstacles Faced by Microinsurance Providers 
 Despite the many benefits associated with providing microinsurance to the poor, there are 
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still a number of obstacles to overcome before widespread microinsurance coverage can occur. 
First and foremost amongst these challenges is the pervasiveness of misconceptions regarding 
insurance amongst poor communities and the lack of actual knowledge about what these services 
provide. Secondly, the price of premia charged for microinsurance services can often act as a 
barrier to families with lower incomes, effectively barring them from receiving insurance 
coverage. Finally, the normal problems associated with insurance, such as adverse selection, 
moral hazard and the transactions costs of investigating claims take on a greater significance in 
the microinsurance arena. 
 The task of providing effective insurance coverage to the poor is made vastly more 
difficult by a lack of understanding of the product by the target market itself. (Churchill, 2006) 
One aspect of this is the widely held view among the poor that insurance is a service normally 
reserved for the elite, which results in apprehension about the intentions of the microinsurance 
provider. Building off of this idea is the fact that many low income households have a very 
limited amount of resources to work with and convincing them to pay for an intangible product 
that may or may not provide a return can be a difficult endeavor. Furthermore, there have been a 
number of cases in which there has been miscommunication between the microinsurance 
provider and the recipient of the service over what is covered by the insurance policy. This can 
result in a decreased level of trust of insurance providers within the local community, reducing 
the effectiveness of microinsurance schemes. (Siegel et al, 2001) However, this problem is not 
without its solutions. Due to its importance in increasing the demand for microinsurance 
services, educating the poor has been a top priority for many microinsurance providers. One of 
the most effective ways of doing this has been to engage in street theater performances 
demonstrating the concept of insurance and the benefits poor families can derive from it. This 
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method is quite effective as it uses a very basic framework to get its message across and does not 
require viewers to be literate to understand the message, which is a problem when working with 
pamphlets or posters. 
 The other major obstacle towards being able to provide microinsurance coverage to the 
poor is the level at which the premium payments are set. If the premium is set too low, there will 
be an influx of people who want to take advantage of microinsurance services while the provider 
will be unable to recoup its costs. If the microinsurance provider wants to set a higher premium 
in order to account for the potential risks of insuring low income households, there would be a 
much lower demand for the microinsurance service due to the extremely price sensitive nature of 
these services. For example a World Bank project aimed at providing microinsurance in India 
reduced the price of their services by 10% in order to gauge the effect on demand, which 
ultimately increased by 7%. (Gine et al, 2010) This indicates that although many people in poor 
communities may have a willingness to pay for microinsurance, they may not have the ability to 
do so and any decrease in price will see a substantial increase in demand. (Siegel et al, 2010) 
 The next set of obstacles is faced by all insurance providers the world over, however they 
are even more important when providing microinsurance due to the nature of the target market 
and its structure. First are the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, which negatively 
affect the ability of microinsurance providers to effectively perform their role in the market. For 
example, by providing poor farmers with the prospect of receiving payment for their goods, 
regardless of whether their crops fail or not, they will be less willing to put effort into producing 
high quality crops. (Morduch, 2006) Similarly, adverse selection is a situation in which riskier 
customers take part in insurance schemes while less risky customers opt not to take part in the 
program, resulting in more payouts by the insurance provider. These outcomes are undesirable as 
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they result in much higher costs to the provider and could jeopardize the provision of 
microinsurance services to the poor. Also serving to increase costs are the transactions costs 
associated with investigating each claim in order to determine whether a payout should be made. 
In the developing world, in situations where there are a large number of microinsurance 
recipients, the transactions costs associated with investigating each case would be quite high. 
This is a problem that is still being dealt with, although there are a few methods of reducing the 
transactions costs which I will go into later in this paper. Although there are a number of 
obstacles faced by the microinsurance sector, there are also solutions to these problems and as 
momentum builds within the sector, more solutions will become apparent and viable. 
Section VI – Insuring Rainfall: A More Effective Form of Microinsurance? 
 One microinsurance scheme that was implemented in India with help from the World 
Bank sought to find a way of providing microinsurance without suffering from the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The scheme that was created was based around the level of 
rainfall in a rural area over the course of the monsoon season, with payouts to farmers increasing 
as rainfall levels fell. This was an interesting approach to take as it insured against something the 
farmers had no control over. By insuring against rainfall, farmers were once again given an 
incentive to put their full effort into their crops as they were no longer guaranteed a payout for 
their produce. (Gine et al, 2010) Likewise, adverse selection was also accounted for because low 
risk farmers would be more likely to take out insurance policies on their crops while high risk 
farmers would be more hesitant about taking out policies. This is due to the likelihood of their 
crops failing due to farmer error rather than lack of rainfall, which would not result in a payout 
for them. 
 Not only does rainfall insurance help solve some of the main problems of microinsurance 
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schemes; it also has other benefits that make this form of microinsurance provision stand out 
from the rest. Due to its dependence on rainfall for determining payouts, data can be collected in 
real time from monitoring stations and payouts can be calculated without having to investigate 
each household's policy individually. (Morduch, 2006, p. 348) This serves to reduce time 
between the shock event (lack of rainfall) and the payout to farmers, as well as the transactions 
costs normally associated with microinsurance schemes.  
However, rainfall insurance schemes are not perfect and do suffer from some problems. 
For example, to be able to set accurate premia firms must have access to rainfall records for the 
past few decades, which are nonexistent in a number of Indian provinces. This means that the 
organizations involved have to begin taking records, and will have to continue doing so for some 
time, in order to provide accurate prices for their clients, who cannot afford mistakenly elevated 
premia. Another potential problem is the difference between rainfall monitoring stations and the 
houses that are a part of the microinsurance scheme. If there is too large a distance between the 
monitoring station and the household there could be discrepancies between the amount of rainfall 
and the payout to the household, which could be detrimental to the household's standard of 
living. In order to address this issue, the microinsurance provider must set up  
Section VII – Methods of Providing Microinsurance 
 When I first began writing this paper, I theorized that the microinsurance sector would be 
dominated by non-profit organizations due to the miniscule profit margins associated with each 
policy and the prevalence of non-profits within the microfinance market. However, in doing my 
research I have learned that some of the largest providers of microinsurance policies in India and 
Southeast Asia are in fact, large banks. At first glance this may seem odd, but when factoring in 
the total profits gathered from all microinsurance policies and the methods of distribution 
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discussed below, it is surprising that banks in other areas of the world do not provide these 
services. 
 The two main types of microinsurance provision models are the partner-agent model and 
the full service insurance model. (Chandhok, 2009) The full service model describes a situation 
in which the provider of the insurance policy is also responsible for all other aspects of 
distribution of services, payments and claims assessments. However, the insurer is also able to 
retain all of the profits from the policies sold. The partner-agent model is slightly different in that 
it involves the cooperation of an insurance provider, such as a bank, as well as a microfinance 
institution
1
. The reason for this teamwork is that each party in the model is able to take 
advantage of the other's comparative advantage in order to provide their services. The bank is 
able to utilize the MFI's networks among poor communities to sell policies as well as to conduct 
claims assessments quickly and cheaply. The MFI increases its ability to provide financial 
services to the poor, while the risk is being undertaken by the bank. The rainfall insurance 
scheme described above was a partner-agent model. 
 In the partner-agent model of microinsurance provision, the bank or insurer takes all of 
the risk associated with the microinsurance policies the MFI is able to sell. As a result of this, it 
also receives all of the profits associated with the accounts, showing how this team of non-profit 
and for-profit firms is able to work together effectively. By allowing the insurer to take all of the 
profits and only receiving enough money to cover its costs, the MFI is able to meet the non-
distribution constraint, allowing it to continue working with a firm that operates for profit. A 
further benefit of operating in this manner is the trustworthiness that is associated with non-profit 
organizations. People may be more willing to trust a non-profit organization, rather than a for-
                                                 
1
 See (Siegel et al, 2001, p. 20) 
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profit organization, with their money and potential livelihoods. 
Section VIII – Conclusion 
 Although microinsurance is a relatively new field that has been overshadowed by the 
successes of other microfinancial services, namely microcredit, it has begun to show real 
potential. In the absence of microinsurance services, rural, low income communities are forced to 
resort to informal methods of coping with losses. These losses are often ineffective or result in 
increased costs for the family during a time of economic hardship. Although most families 
manage to cope during these times, it is often at the cost of drastically reduced levels of 
consumption and a fall in the standard of living they enjoyed. 
 By providing these communities with microinsurance services, they are less vulnerable to 
adverse shocks and property losses. They are also able to enjoy a higher level of disposable 
income, as they no longer need to save as much as a “safety net” against disaster. By freeing up 
this new income these families are able to increase their standards of living, by increasing their 
food and home security as well as by increasing their social capital. Also, when microinsurance 
schemes are used in conjunction with microcredit schemes, they are able to provide the poor with 
a wider range of financial services. This both increases the effectiveness of both schemes but 
also serves the consumer better by providing services focused on his needs. 
 However, there are a number of problems associated with microinsurance, such as high 
transactions costs, moral hazard and adverse selection. These are problems that are extremely 
difficult to remove entirely, but some of the new methods of providing microinsurance have 
taken steps to reduce their impacts. In order to make microinsurance services cost effective, 
partner-agent models of insurance provision should be expanded as this helps to severely cut 
back on costs and allows for insurance services to be provided to a large number of recipients at 
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low costs due to the non-profit and for-profit actors' comparative advantages. Similarly, rainfall 
insurance schemes help eliminate some of the problems associated with adverse selection as well 
as moral hazard, making schemes in this vein a possibility for expansion in the future. 
 Given the evidence considered in this paper, microinsurance schemes can provide a 
necessary service to potentially billions of needy consumers around the world. Despite the 
limitations I have discussed, the benefits are staggering and with more research into this field, 
microinsurance can become a positive force in the lives of many people living in poverty, rather 
than a dream that is just out of reach. 
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